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I. INTRODUCTION

I fail to understand why the invitee-licensee distinction should
continue to exist, primarily because I don't think landowners
manage their property with these common-law distinctions in
mind.'
Should individuals who are injured while on the property of another go
uncompensated for their injuries because of the purpose of their particular visit?
Courts have dealt with this issue in a variety of ways: retaining the invitee, licensee,
and trespasser categories; completely abandoning the common-law classifications;
Self v. Queen, 487 S.E.2d 295, 300 (W. Va. 1997) (Starcher, J., concurring).
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and abrogating the invitee-licensee distinction while retaining the trespasser
category? On February 24, 1997, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
elected to maintain the status quo and retain the common-law categories in
determining a landowner's duty of care.3
The recent decision by the state supreme court niarks the first time our court
has addressed the issue of whether to retain the common-law categories or modify
the manner in which a landowner's liability is determined The majority opinion
refused to alter the current system of determining a landowner's duty of care owed
to others on his or her land.'
This Case Comment will examine the decision of the state supreme court
in Self v. Queen. It will also discuss alternative courses of action the court could
have taken. Finally, it will offer a prediction as to the direction West Virginia
would go if the court chose to modify the status quo.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The facts of Selfv. Queen were simple and not in dispute. The plaintiff,
Gaynelle Self, had returned to West Virginia from her home in Michigan to visit
friends, relatives, and her mother in Wayne County While at her sister's house,
the plaintiff agreed to purchase some milk for her mother, who lived next door.'
The plaintiff's mother is Mayme Queen, the defendant in the case! As the plaintiff
was getting into her car to go to the store, her mother, the defendant, called out to

2

See generally Vitauts M. Gulbis, Annotation, Modern Status of Rules Conditioning

Landowner'sLiability Upon Status of InjuredPartyas Invitee, Licensee, or Trespasser,22 A.L.R.4TH
294 (1981) (discussing treatment of common-law status distinctions in different jurisdictions).
See Self, 487 S.E.2d at 299 (per curiam).
But c.f Miller v. Monongahela Power Co., 403 S.E.2d 406, 411 (W. Va. 1991); see also
Cavender v. Fouty, 464 S.E.2d 736, 739 (W. Va. 1995) (quoting Miller, 403 S.E.2d at 411); Jack v.
Fritts, 457 S.E.2d 431, 437 (W. Va. 1995) (quoting Miller, 403 S.E.2d at 411) (reaffirming the
common-law categories).

4

5

See Self 487 S.E.2d at 299.

6

Id. at 296.

7

Id.

8

Id.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol100/iss2/9

2

Kleeh: Self v. Queen: Retaining Eighteenth Century Feudalistic Jurisprud

1997)

SELF v. QUEEN

her to come get money to pay for the milk? Walking across her mother's yard to
get the money, Ms. Self broke her ankle after stepping in a "deep hole" and
falling."0
The plaintiff brought a negligence action against her mother for the injuries
she suffered because of the fall." The defendant filed a motion for summary
judgment, arguing that Ms. Self was a "mere licensee" at the time of the incident,
and that the only duty that her mother owed her was to refrain from willful or
wanton misconduct. 2 After hearing arguments, the Circuit Court of Wayne County
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding that Ms. Self
"occupied the status of a licensee at the time of the fall and that her mother was not
guilty of willful or wanton misconduct in the maintenance of the premises on which
the fall occurred."' 3 Because the plaintiff's visit was merely a social one, the circuit
14
court entered summary judgment for the defendant, Ms. Queen.
Ms. Self appealed to the state supreme court claiming that the circuit court
incorrectly classified her as a licensee rather than an invitee. 5 In addition, Ms. Self
urged the court "to change the established law in this state relating to liability
involving invitees and licensees."' 6 The court found that the plaintiff was a
licensee, and because the defendant did not act in a willful or wanton manner, the
trial court was correct in granting the motion for summary judgmentP Further, the
court refused to adopt the position urged by the plaintiff and retained the
distinction between invitees, licensees, and trespassers in order to maintain a "more
exact and specific rule" as opposed to a "vague and indefinite" one.'

9

Id.

10

Id. at 297.

11

See id.

12

See id.

13

Id.

14

See id.

15

Id.

16

Id.

17

See id. at 298.

18

Id.
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III. BACKGROUND OF THE LAW

A.

History ofRecovery for InjuriesSustained on the Premises ofAnother

When the English common law was defining the landowner's duty of care
to visitors on the landowner's property, the landowner was "the backbone of the
social system" and "land ownership was synonymous with power and
importance."' 9 As a result, the landowner was afforded "many rights and
2°
privileges," and significant focus was placed on his "proprietary interests." As
the common law developed, landowners occupied a "privileged position" in society;
in addition, the principle of imposing liability for foreseeable damages was
"hesitatingly recognised."2 1
With these attitudes prevalent in society, the judiciary, beginning in the
nineteenth century and continuing into modem times, classified persons entering
land, and from there determined the duties owed by the landowner.Y Typically,
24
visitors onto land are categorized as either trespassers, licensees, or invitees.
Generally, these categories create a "rough sliding scale, by which, as the legal
status of the visitor improves, the possessor of the land owes him more of an
obligation of protection."

Stephen R. Brooks, Note, Torts-Invitees, Licensees and Trespassers- A Trend Towards

19

Abolishing Classificationof Entrants,76 W. VA. L. REV. 202, 202 (1973-74).
20

Id.

21

Norman S. Marsh,

The History and Comparative Law of Invitees, Licensees, and

Trespassers,69 L.Q. REV. 182, 184 (1953).
22

Brooks, supra note 19, at 202.

23

2 FOWLER V. HARPER& FLEMING JAMES, JR., LAW OF TORTS § 27.1, at 1430 (1956).

24

Id.

25

W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS,

§ 58,

at 393 (5th

ed. 1984).
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Standardsfor Liabilityin Actions AgainstLand Owners
1.

Trespasser

The trespasser is placed at the lowest end of the aforementioned scale 6 "A
trespasser is a person who enters or remains upon land in the possession of another
without a privilege to do so created by the possessor's consent or otherwise. 2 7 A
'
landowner has a "legally protected interest in the exclusiveness of his possession."28
Thus, intruders who enter without the landowner's consent may not request that the
possessor maintain a "safe place to trespass," or that the landowner provide
protection for their unlawful use of his property.29 As a result, a landowner is
generally not liable to trespassers for injuries sustained because he failed to use
"reasonable care" in maintaining his land in a "safe condition," or to behave "in a
manner which does not endanger them."'3 However, the "discovered [adult]
trespasser" exception" has altered the Restatement rule and resulted in the
only owes to a trespasser a duty to refrain
frequently stated rule that a possessor
32
from willful or wanton misconduct.
Different rules are applicable to a trespassing child.3 The "attractive
nuisance" doctrine has been developed by courts to protect children because they
are unable to perceive or appreciate the "dangers which [they] may encounter in

26

Id.

27

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §

28

KEETON, supra note 25, § 58, at 393.

29

Id.

30

Id. at 393-94; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 333 (1965). See generally Fleming

329 (1965).

James, Jr., Tort Liabilityof OccupiersofLand: Duties Owed to Trespassers,63 YALE L.J. 144 (1953).
31

See KEETON, supra note 25, § 58, at 396-97. This exception to the trespasser rule requires

"that the occupier exercise reasonable care for his safety once his presence is known." Id.
32

See id. § 58, at 397.

33

See id. § 59, at 400.
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trespassing," or make wise choices "as to the chances [they] will take.'
jurisdictions have adopted the approach set forth in the Restatement.35

4

Most

West Virginia treats intruders in a similar fashion. The state supreme court
has defined a trespasser as an individual "who goes upon the property of another
without invitation, express or implied, and does so out of curiosity, or for his own
36
purpose or convenience, and not in the performance of any duty to the owner.
Further, West Virginia affords trespassers protections similar to those in other
jurisdictions.37 Specifically, landowners do not owe a trespasser a duty of due
care. 8 "[O]rdinarily, with regard to a trespasser, a possessor of property only need
'
refrain from willful or wanton injury."39
As a result, a landowner will not be held
liable for injuries suffered by trespassers because he failed to exercise "reasonable

See id. § 59, at 399-402 (discussing the development of the attractive nuisance doctrine on
the federal and state levels).
34

See id. The Restatement defines the "attractive nuisance" doctrine as follows:
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm to children trespassing
thereon caused by an artificial condition upon the land if
(a) the place where the condition exists is one upon which the possessor
knows or has reason to know that children are likely to trespass, and
(b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or has reason to
know and which he realizes or should realize will involve an unreasonable risk of
death or serious bodily harm to such children, and
(c) the children because of their youth do not discover the condition or
realize the risk involved in intermeddling with it or in coming within the area
made dangerous by it, and
(d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition and the
burden of eliminating the danger are slight as compared with the risk to children
involved, and
(e) the possessor fails to exercise the reasonable care to eliminate the
danger or otherwise to protect the children.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 339 (1965).
35

36

Waddell v. New River Co., 93 SE.2d 473,476 (W. Va. 1956). See Huffman v. Appalachian

Power Co., 415 S.E.2d 145, 148 (W. Va.1991) (defining the trespasser category).
37

See supra note 26 and 32 and accompanying text (discussing duty owed to a trespasser).

38

Huffman, 415 S.E.2d at 148.

Miller v. Monongahela Power Co., 403 S.E.2d 406, 411 (W. Va. 1991) (citing Buckley v.
Valley Camp Coal Co., 324 F.2d 244, 246 (4th Cir. 1963) (applying West Virginia Law)).

39
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care" in maintaining his land in a "reasonably safe condition," or to behave in a
manner which does not "endanger them."4
West Virginia does differ from the majority ofjurisdictions with regard to
the "attractive nuisance" doctrine. Indeed, West Virginia does not recognize the
"attractive nuisance" doctrine, but has instead adopted the "dangerous
instrumentality" doctrine.4 The court has stated, "[a]n owner or proprietor of a
dangerous instrumentality must exercise reasonable care to avoid injury to a
trespassing child, whose presence at the time and place of danger was either known
to the proprietor or might reasonably have been anticipated." '2 The court has
established this less restrictive rule based on similar policy reasons as the "attractive
nuisance" doctrine.43 The exception was created because children are seen as
"heedless," and their "inexperience and immaturity" prevents them from "fully
appreciat[ing]" the harm that can result from "a dangerous condition or

instrumentality."'
2.

Licensee

A licensee is the common-law category used to describe an individual who
enters land with the consent of the owner "and nothing more."'1 5 Licensees have the
landowner's permission to enter the land; however, they do so only "for their own

40

Huffman, 415 S.E.2d at 149. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 333 (1965);

65 C.J.S. Negligence §§ 63(7), 63(9) (1966).
41

See Hatten v. Mason Realty Co., 135 S.E.2d 236,241 (W. Va. 1964). See also Waddell, 93

S.E.2d at 476-77.
Hatten, 135 S.E.2d at 241 (citations omitted). The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
has elaborated on the "dangerous instrumentality" doctrine as follows:
where a dangerous instrumentality or condition exists at a place frequented by
children who thereby suffer injury, the parties responsible for such dangerous
condition may be held liable for such injury if they knew, or should have known,
of the dangerous condition and that children frequented the dangerous premises
either for pleasure or out of curiosity.
Huffiman, 415 S.E.2d at 153 (W. Va. 1991); see also Sutton v. Monongahela Power Co., 158 S.E.2d
98, 104 (W. Va. 1967).
42

43

See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.

44

Huffman, 415 S.E.2d at 153.

45

KEETON, supra note 25, § 60, at 412. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS

§ 330 (1965)

(defining a licensee as "a person who is privileged to enter or remain on land only by virtue of the
possessor's consent").
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purposes," which are unrelated to the landowner's "interests. 46 Included in this
category are social guests of the landowner 7 Legally, a guest is "nothing more
than a licensee, to whom the possessor owes no duty of inspection nor affirmative

care to make the premises safe for his visit." 8 Similar to trespassers,' 9 the only duty
a landowner owes a licensee is to refrain from willful or wanton misconduct. 0
West Virginia follows similar ideas with respect to licensees. In order to

be considered a licensee, a person must have the permission of the landowner or the
landowner's authorized agent to enter upon the land.' Further, the court has
likewise classified a social guest as a licensee. 52 With respect to licensees, West
Virginia courts do not require a landowner to protect them from "dangers which
arise out of the existing condition of the premises inasmuch as the licensee goes
' Thus, the
upon the premises subject to all of the dangers attending such entry."53
only duty owed a licensee is to refrain from willful or wanton misconduct.5 4
3.

Invitee

The final common-law category is that of invitee. An invitee is an
individual who enters upon the premises ofthe landowner for business purposes and

46

HARPER & JAMES, supra note

23, § 27.1, at 1431.

47

See KEETON, supra note 25, § 60, at 414.

48

Id.

49

See supra notes 26-44 and accompanying text.

50

See KEETON, supra note 25, § 60, at 415.

51

See Wadell v. New River Co., 93 S.E.2d 473, 476 (W. Va. 1956). See also Miller v.

Monongahela Power Co., 403 S.E.2d 406, 410 (W. Va. 1991); Hamilton v. Brown, 207 S.E.2d 923,
925 (W. Va. 1974); Wellman v. Christian, 126 S.E.2d 375, 379 (W. Va. 1962) (holding "mere
permissive use of the premises, by express or implied authority, creates only a license.").
52

See Jack v. Fritts, 457 S.E.2d 431, 436 (W. Va. 1995). In Jack, the court relied on the

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

53

§ 330 cmt. h(3). Id. at 436-37.

Miller, 403 S.E.2d at 410-11; Hamilton, 207 S.E.2d at 925; Wellman, 126 S.E.2d at 379.

See Jack, 457 S.E.2d at 437 (quoting Atkinson v. Harman, 158 S.E.2d 169, 174 (W. Va.
1967) (quoting 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 63 (32) (1966))).

54
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upon the landowner's invitation, either expressed or implied

5

With respect to an

invitee, the landowner does not ensure "the safety of invitees," but has a duty "to
exercise reasonable care for their
protection."56 Thus, an invitee is "placed on a
5 17
licensee.
a
than
higher footing
Again, West Virginia conforms to the majority rule throughout the country
with respect to invitees. In Burdette v. Burdette,58 the court defined an invitee as
an individual who enters the premises or "uses a place of business" for business
purposes. 9 The landowner owes an invitee a duty of "ordinary care to keep and
maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition." ' As a result, although the
owner is not an ensurer of an invitee's safety, the landowner is not liable for the

invitee's6 injuries if the owner is not negligent or does not act in a willful or wanton

manner.

1

IV. THE DECISION
The Wayne County Circuit Court granted summary judgement in Queen's
favor because it found that Self was a licensee at the time of her injury and Queen

"was not guilty of willful or wanton misconduct in the maintenance of the premises
on which the fall occurred."62 In reviewing this decision, the state supreme court
was forced to consider the common-law distinctions of invitee and licensee and the
different duties of care imposed on possessors of land with regard to these
See KEETON, supranote 25, § 61, at 419. This description of an invitee traces its origin to
the English case of Indermaurv. Dames,L.R. 1 C.P. 274,35 L.J.C.P. 184, affd L.R. 2 C.P. 311, 36
L.J.C.P. 181 (1866). KEETON, supra note 25, § 61, at 419. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §332 (1965) (defining an invitee as either a public invitee or a business visitor).
5

supra note 25, § 61, at 425.

56

KEETON,

57

Id.

58

127 S.E.2d 249 (W. Va. 1962).

Id. at 252. See McDonald v. University of West Virginia Bd. of Trustees, 444 S.E.2d 57,
59 (W. Va. 1994); Miller v. Monongahela Power Co., 403 S.E.2d 406, 410 (W. Va. 1991).

59

60

Estate of Helmick v. Martin, 453 S.E.2d 335, 338 (W. Va. 1994); Andrick v. Town of

Buckhannon, 421 S.E.2d 247, 250 (W. Va. 1992); Miller, 403 S.E.2d at 410; Burdette v. Burdette,
127 S.E.2d 249, 252 (W. Va. 1962).
61

See Estate ofHelmick 453 S.E.2d at 339; McDonald,444 S.E.2d at 59.

62

Se/f, 487 S.E.2d at 296.
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categories.6 3 The Selfcourt examined the duties of care imposed on landowners
with regard to licensees and invitees.6 Specifically, the court held that Self was a
social guest of Queen and was thus a licensee. 5 Therefore, Queen owed a duty only
to refrain from willful and wanton misconduct and "the record failed to show that"
Queen acted in a willful or wanton manner.6 Further, the court rejected Self s
proposal to abrogate the common-law status-based duties in favor of a single
standard of care.67 Consequently, the court agreed with the circuit court and
affirmed the entry of summary judgment against Self. 8
The majority opinion was issuedper curiam 9 Justice Starcher, joined by
Chief Justice Workman, wrote a concurring opinion suggesting that the court may
someday abandon the status-based standard of liability imposed on possessors of
land.7" The separate opinions illustrate the difficulty courts face when confronted
with the question of whether to retain or abandon the common-law distinctions of
invitee, licensee, and trespasser.
A.

Per CuriamMajority Opinion

In Self,the state supreme court decided to retain the different categories in
determining the duty imposed on land owners for injuries suffered on their
property.7 1 The Selfopinion examined the current state of the law in West Virginia
and elected to maintain the status quo.72 This decision to retain the common-law

63

Id. at 297.

64

Id.

65

See id. at 298.

66

Id.

67

See id.

68

See id.

69

Id. at 296.

70

See id. at 302.

71

See id. at 299.

72

See id. at 297-99.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol100/iss2/9

10

Kleeh: Self v. Queen: Retaining Eighteenth Century Feudalistic Jurisprud
1997]

SELF v. QUEEN

categories of invitee and licensee places West Virginia in the minority of states
unwilling to abandon the old common-law rule for a single standard of negligence.'
After a discussion of the facts and procedure of the case,74 the Selfcourt
addressed the appropriate standard for granting summaryjudgment.7 The Selfcourt
then focused its attention on the true legal issue of the case: whether Self should be
classified as an invitee or a licensee.76
The Sefcourt initially explained that the distinction between the invitee
and licensee classifications is important in West Virginia because of the "different
'
duties of care" imposed on landowners "with regard to licensees and invitees."77
8
In making its decision, the court turned to Cavender v. Fout/ to describe the
specific duties owed to persons injured on the property of another.79 The court
reiterated the long-standing principle that a landowner owes an invitee the duty to
exercise ordinary care to keep and maintain the premises in a reasonably safe
condition.""° The Selfcourt then distinguished this duty of care owed to an invitee
from that owed to a licensee."' A licensee "is a person on another's property with
expressed or implied permission." 2 Thus, unlike the owner's duty to an invitee,

73

See id. at 301-02.

74

See supra notes 6-18 and accompanying text.

75

See Self, 487 S.E.2d at 297. See also Painter v. Peavy, 451 S.E.2d 755, 759 (W. Va. 1994):
Summary judgment is appropriate where the record taken as a whole could not
lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, such as where the
nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element
of the case that it has the burden to prove.

Id.
76

See Self,487 S.E.2d at 297.

77

Id.

78

464 S.E.2d 736, 740 (W. Va. 1995).

79

See Self,487 S.E.2d at 297.

80

Id. See Morgan v. Price, 150 S.E.2d 897, 901 (W. Va. 1966) (defining the duty owed to an

invitee when injured on the premises of another).
81

See Self,487 S.E.2d at 297.

82

Id.
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"the property owner does not have to correct the dangers arising from existing
conditions" where the person is a licensee." The court noted that
[m]ere permissive use of the premises, by express or implied
authority ordinarily creates only a license, and as to a licensee, the
law does not impose upon the owner of the property an obligation
to provide against dangers which arise out of the existing condition
of the premises . . . subject to all the dangers attending such
conditions.8 4
After reviewing the limited duty of care owed to licensees, the court turned
to identifying the proper classification of a social guest8 5 The Self court noted that
West Virginia follows the same rule as a majority of jurisdictions in the United
States classifying a social guest as "nothing more than a licensee."8 6
After this conclusion, the court turned its attention to the facts of the
present case. 7 The court reasoned that, although Self was in the process of
performing a service for Queen at the time of her injury, she was nonetheless a
social guest.8 The court justified its conclusion that Self was a licensee by noting
that Self was actually "gratuitously performing an incidental service for her hostess,
her mother."89

83

Id.

Id. See Miller v. Monongahela Power Co., 403 S.E.2d 406, 410-11 (W. Va. 1991) (quoting
Hamilton v. Brown, 207 S.E.2d 923, 925 (W. Va. 1974)); Hamilton, 207 S.E.2d at 925 (quoting
Wellman v. Christian, 126 S.E.2d 375, 379 (W. Va. 1962)).
84

85

See Self, 487 S.E.2d at 297.

Id. See Jack v. Fritts 457 S.E.2d 431, 437 (W. Va. 1995) (holding that social guests are
afforded the classification of a licensee). The court turned to Professor Keeton for guidance in this area
of the law: "The guest is legally nothing more than a licensee, to whom the possessor owes no duty of
86

inspection nor affirmative care to make the premises safe for his visit."
at 414.
87

See Self,487 S.E.2d at 298.

88

See id.

89

Id.
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After making this determination, the court proceeded to examine Queen's
conduct leading up to the date of the injury.' The Selfcourt concluded that Queen
did not act in a willful or wanton manner and that "no fair" review of the record
would reveal such behavior.91 Consequently, the court concluded that the entry of
summary judgment for Queen was proper.'
The Self court then addressed the "extraordinary proposal" of Self's
attorney to revisit the common-law distinctions of invitee, licensee, and trespasser
in determining the duty of a land owner 9 3 The court relied on the fact that West
Virginia has recognized the differences between invitees, licensees, and trespassers
"since we left the Mother State."94 The court based its analysis on the law's
preference for "the more exact and specific rule as opposed to the vague and
indefinite.""5
The court dismissed Self s argument to abandon the distinction between
invitees and licensees in favor of a "single reasonable care standard." In doing so,
the Selfcourt stressed that our jurisprudence favors more specific rules, noting that
the common-law categories of invitee and licensee "provide us with a precise,
definite gauge by which to measure the extent of the duty of care owed the visitor
and clearly defines the precaution to be taken. The standard is precise and not
vague."97 The court reasoned that altering the rule from a "specific and definite
standard" to a "vague single, reasonable care standard would in effect leave 'every
case, without rudder or compass, to the jury."'9 8 Thus, the court refused to follow

90

See id.

91

Id.

92

See id.

93

Id.

94

Id.

95

Id.

96

Id.

97

Id.

98

Id. at 299 (quoting 0. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 112 (1909)). The court noted that

Holmes labeled the reasonable care standard "a featureless generality." Id.(quoting HOLMES, supra,

at 111).
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the suggestion of Self s attorney and, in the court's language, "change the rule from
specific to vague."99
In summary, the court held that because Self was a mere social guest, she
was a licensee. Therefore, Queen was only required to refrain from willful or
wanton misconduct." Because the record revealed no proof of willful or wanton

misconduct, the court affirmed the trial court's award of summary judgment. 0 '
Furthermore, the court refuted Self s suggestion to abrogate the common-law
categories of invitee and licensee in favor of a single reasonable care standard.'
B.

Justice Starcher'sConcurringOpinion

Justice Starcher began his concurring opinion by noting his agreement with
the conclusion of the majority; however, Justice Starcher stated entirely different
reasons for this conclusion. 3 Starcher declined to consider Self s "extraordinary
proposal""' because the issue was never raised at the trial court. 0 5
Justice Starcher expressed his disapproval of the majority's reasoning in
retaining the common-law distinctions between invitees, licensees, and

99

Self, 487 S.E.2d at 298-99.

Inmaking this determination, the Supreme Court of Appeals of

West Virginia placed significant reliance inthe writings of Oliver Wendell Holmes,Jr. "[S]tatutes and
decisions have busied themselves... with substituting for the vague test of the care exercised by a
prudent man,aprecise one of specific acts of omissions." Id. See also HOLMES,supranote 98, at 112.
The court further relied on Holmes instating,
[i]t
isequally clear that the featureless generality, that the defendant was bound
to use such care as aprudent man would do under the circumstances, ought to be
continually giving place to the specific one,that he was bound to use this or that
precaution under these or those circumstances.
Self, 487 S.E.2d at 298-99. See also HOLMES, supra note 98, at 111.
100

Self, 487 S.E.2d at 298.

101

Id.

102

Id. at 299.

103

Id.

104

Id. at 298.

5
Id.at 299. Inhis decision to concur, Justice Starcher noted that the "[c]ourt will usually
decline to address a legal position when itwas not addressed below." Id. Justice Starcher indicated
apropensity to agree with the position advanced by Self on appeal; however, he felt "compelled to
accept the majority's position that this isnot the right case for taking that step." Id.
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trespassers." 6 He criticized the majority's reliance on the works of Holmes because

Justice Holmes composed his writings when "the harsh rules of contributory
negligence, assumption of the risk, and the fellow-servant doctrine" were becoming

embedded in the law.

7

Starcher noted that the attitudes prevalent in Holmes' time

"have weathered and fallen in the face of time, reason, and a growing intolerance
for human suffering that has accompanied the post-industrial era."'0 8
Further, Justice Starcher criticized the majority's reliance on Holmes for
guidance in this case by noting that the behavior and activity outside of a courtroom
are not governed by "rules and ready-made generalizations."'0 9 Rather than follow
the reasoning of Holmes, Starcher turned to Justice Benjamin Cardozo, who urged

courts to abolish "artificial rules and precedents that have nothing to do with the
way people order their affairs" for guidance."' Based on these principles, Starcher
concluded that the common-law categories used to determine a land owner's duty
of care rarely dictate the actions of the parties.'
Although advocating the retention of the trespasser category, Justice
Starcher expressed doubt as to whether the invitee-licensee distinctions should

106

Id.

107

Id.

108
Id. at 299. Justice Starcher relied on West Virginia precedent in his criticism of Holmes.
See W. VA. CODE § 23-1-1 to -18 (1994) (abolishing the fellow-servant doctrine by establishing a
workers' compensation system of benefits); King v. Kayak Mfg. Corp., 387 S.E.2d 511, 516-19 (W.
Va. 1989) (abolishing the doctrine of assumption of risk and adopting the doctrine of comparative
assumption of risk); Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879, 885 (W. Va. 1979)
(abolishing contributory negligence and adopting modified comparative negligence).
109

Self, 487 S.E.2d at 300.

110

Id. In making this determination, Starcher examined the works of Justice Cardozo:

I think that when a rule, after it has been duly tested by experience, has been found
to be inconsistent with the sense ofjustice or with the social welfare, there should
be less hesitation in frank avowal and full abandonment .... There should be
greater readiness to abandon an untenable position when the rule to be discarded
may not reasonably be supposed to have determined the conduct of the litigants,
and particularly when in its origin it was the product of institutions or conditions
which have gained a new significance or development with the progress of years.
Id. See also B. CARDozo, Tim NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 150-51 (1949).
III

Self,487 S.E.2d at 300.
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continue to exist."' Justice Starcher explained that the retention of the status-based
categories places West Virginia among the minority ofjurisdictions in the United

States."' Further, Starcher supported his reasoning by turning to the letters of
Thomas Jefferson: "[W]e should not look at our constitutions and laws with
'sanctimonious reverence, and deem them like the ark of the covenant, too sacred
to be touched."' 4 In conclusion, Justice Starcher indicated that at some time in the
future, the court might address the "possibility" of abolishing the common-law
6
categories.!
In summary, Justice Starcher, joined by Chief Justice Workman, agreed
with the result of the majority opinion; however, they criticized the reasoning of
the majority."7 The concurring justices refused to consider Self s proposition to
abolish the common-law categories of invitee, licensee, and trespasser because the
appellant failed to raise the issue at trial."' However, the justices indicated a

112

Id. In his reasoning, Starcher noted that "a landowner doesn't owe a trespasser the time of

day." Id. On the other hand, the invitee-licensee distinctions should be abolished because, in his
words, "landowners [do not] manage their property with these common-law status distinctions in
mind." Id. "No one declines to clean the garage, shovel snow off a sidewalk, or fill in potholes in a
yard with the licensee-invitee rule in mind." Id. at 301.
113

Id. Starcher explained that "at least twenty-five of our sister states plus the District of

Columbia have already abandoned the licensee-invitee status distinction in premises law cases." Id.
This statement may be somewhat erroneous. The concurring justices refer to Connecticut as one of
at least two states enacting statutes to abolish the distinction between licensees and invitees. Id. at 302
(citing CONN.GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-557a (West 1991)). The Supreme Court of Connecticut has held
that section 52-557a "manifests no legislative undertaking to abrogate all distinctions between
licensees and invitees." Furstein v. Hill, 590 A.2d 939, 945 (Conn. 1991). Conversely, the court held
that the statute was "intended to require a landowner to exercise the same standard of care toward"
,social guests and business invitees. Id. at 946. See Gulbis, supra note 2, at 53 (Supp. Sept. 1997),
114

Self, 487 S.E.2d at 302 (quoting Letter to Samuel Kercheval, July 12, 1816 published In

WRrTNGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
116

10:42-43 (Paul L. Ford ed. 1899)).

Self 487 S.E.2d at 302. The concurring justices qualified this statement by noting that the

proposition must "first cogently [be] addressed at the circuit court level." Id. Further, the opinion
reasoned that if the evidence failed to show that the parties' behavior was "based ...on the licenseeinvitee-trespasser distinctions," and if the "rule is 'inconsistent with the sense of justice or with the
social welfare,"' the court should not hesitate to abandon the "common-law status distinctions in
premises liability cases." Id.
117

Id. at 299.

118

Id.
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willingness to abrogate the classifications if property owners fail to base their
conduct on these status-based distinctions.' 9
120
V. ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION

Courts have reached different conclusions when confronted with the legal
question of abolishing the common-law categories in determining the duty of care
owed by a landowner.' These conclusions can be grouped into three areas: (1)

retention of the common-law categories, (2) complete abrogation of status-based
liability, and (3) retention of only the trespasser category. Further, courts in each

category have reasoned similarly in coming to their decisions.
A.

Retention of the Common-law Categories

Several jurisdictions have decided to retain the status-based system of
liability that the three categories provide." Courts following this school of thought
frequently offer similar justifications for refusing to abandon the long-standing

common-law categories.

119

Id. at 300.

120

See generally Gulbis, supra note 2, for discussion of different jurisdictional treatment of

landowners' standard of care.
121

See supra note 113 and accompanying text.

Courts in these jurisdictions have either declined to abolish the common-law categories or
have not been asked to do so. The Gulbis annotation provides an excellent survey of the law in these
jurisdictions. See Gulbis, supra note 2; see generallyTincani v. Inland Empire Zoological Soc'y., 875
P.2d 621 (Wash. 1994); Harris v. Niehaus, 857 S.W.2d 222 (Mo. 1993); Morin v. Bell Court
Condominium Assn., Inc., 612 A.2d 1197 (Conn. 1992); Dudley v. USX Corp., 606 A.2d 916 (Pa.
Super Ct. 1992); Markle v. Hacienda Mexican Restaurant, 570 N.E.2d 969 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991); Kline
v. Ohio Univ., 610 N.E.2d 1205 (Ohio Ct. CI. 1990); Lohrenz v. Lane, 787 P.2d 1274 (Okla. 1990);
Baldwin v. Mosley, 748 S.W.2d 146 (Ark. 1988); Kirschner v. Louisville Gas & Electric Co., 743
S.W.2d 840 (Ky. 1988); Jannette v. Deprez, 701 S.W.2d 56 (Tex. App. 1985) writ refd n.r.e.; Laser
v. Wilson, 473 A.2d 523 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984); Nicoletti v. Westcor, Inc., 639 P.2d 330 (Ariz.
1982); Huyck v. Hecla Mining Co., 612 P.2d 142 (Idaho 1980); Hughes v. Star Holmes, Inc., 379
So.2d 301 (Miss. 1980); Bailey v. Pennington, 406 A.2d 44 (Del. Sup. 1979); Whaley v. Lawing, 352
So.2d 1090 (Ala. 1977), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 1061 (1980) (applying premises guest statute);
Ramsey v. Mercer, 237 S.E.2d 450 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977); Caroffv. Liberty Lumber Co., 369 A.2d 983
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977); Andrews v. Taylor, 239 S.E.2d 630 (N.C. Ct. App. 1977); Taylor
v. Baker, 566 P.2d 884 (Or. 1977); Rosenau v. Estherville, 199 N.W.2d 125 (Iowa 1972).
122
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For example, in Caroffv. Liberty Lumber Co., the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Appellate Division, declined to abrogate the common-law categories for
determining the duty owed by landowners. 24 In Caroff, the plaintiff was a
governmental official who was required to visit the premises of the defendant as a
part of his public duties." While on an inspection visit, the plaintiff fell on the
premises of the defendant and severely injured his knee. 26 The trial court classified
the plaintiff as a licensee and granted the defendant's "motion for an involuntary
dismissal.' 2 7 On appeal, the plaintiff urged the court to abolish the "historical
distinctions between the invitee, licensee, and the trespasser," in favor of single
standard of "reasonable care.' 12' Relying heavily on an
earlier decision, the New
129
Jersey court refused to "enunciate a new rule of law."'
Additionally, in Snyder v. L Jay Realty Co., 30 the New Jersey Supreme
Court noted the state's long-time adherence to the common-law categories' 3 The
court reasoned that the "common law classifications are sufficiently flexible to
fulfill the purposes of our legal system in serving the needs of present day
society." '
Further, the court concluded that the retention of the historical
classifications provides predictability in the law and assists in the "proper
distribution of trial functions between judge and jury."'' Thus, the New Jersey

123

369 A.2d 983 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977).

124

Id. at 985.

125

Id. at 984.

126

Id.

127

Id at 984-85.

128

Id. at 985.

129

Id. at 985-86.

130

153 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1959).

131

Id. at 5.

132

Id.

133

Id.
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court in Carofj'3 4 and Snyder' applied the common-law status-based standard of

liability.
Similar to the reasoning used by the New Jersey court, West Virginia has

also decided to retain the common-law categories for landowner liability. In Self
v. Queen,'36 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals refused to follow the
suggestion of the plaintiff-appellant and abolish the classifications.'37 In doing so,
the court noted the predictability provided by the invitee, licensee, and trespasser
categories.' 38 Further, the court reasoned that the classifications lend a "specific"
and "precise" measure of liability.'39
Other reasons have been offered by advocates of retaining the common-law

classifications. Some courts have found that the adoption of a single standard of
reasonable care "would replace a stable and established system of loss allocation
with one devoid of standards for liability."'40 In addition, courts have reasoned that
the "harshness" caused by the classifications has been lessened because of
"exceptions" and "sub-classifications" created by the judiciary. 4' Finally, some
argue that this decision, because of the magnitude of the ramifications from "such

134
See generallyCaroffv. Liberty Lumber Co., 369 A.2d 983 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977)
(applying common-law categories of invitee, licensee, and trespasser).

See generallySnyder, 153 A.2d 1 (applying common-law categories of invitee, licensee, and
trespasser).
135

136

487 S.E.2d 295 (W. Va. 1997) (per curiam).

137

Id. at 299.

138

Id at 298. See also Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968) (Burke, J., dissenting).

In this landmark decision, which abrogated the classifications, the dissenters noted the "reasonable and
workable approach" to determining a landowner's liability and the "stability and predictability"
provided by the common-law distinctions. Id. at 569.
139

Self, 487 S.E.2d at 298.

140

Gulbis, supra note 2, at 300. See, e.g., Heins v. Webster County, 552 N.W.2d 51, 55 (Neb.

1996) (discussing the benefits and disadvantages of abrogating the classifications); Jones v. Hansen,
867 P.2d 303, 307 (Kan. 1994) (discussing the benefits and disadvantages of abrogating the
classifications).
Gulbis, supra note 2, at 300; See, e.g., Heins, 552 N.W.2d at 55 (discussing the benefits and
disadvantages of abrogating the classifications); Jones, 867 P.2d at 307 (discussing the benefits and
disadvantages of abrogating the classifications).
141
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a restructuring of the bases for premises liability," should be the responsibility of
the legislature.'
B.

Modification of the Common-law Classifications

Some jurisdictions have decided to alter the common-law categories in
some manner. Two significant legal events preceded this trend and had some
influence on the decision to modify the classifications.'43 In 1957, England, the
birthplace of the common law, passed the Occupiers' Liability Act of 1957,'
which abolished the distinction between45 licensees and invitees, and imposed a
"common duty of care" on landowners.
46 the United
Second, in Kermarecv. Compagnie GeneraleTransatlantique,1
States Supreme Court declined to adopt the common-law categories into admiralty
law. 47 The Court reasoned that

[t]he distinctions which the common law draws between licensee
and invitee were inherited from a culture deeply rooted to the land,
a culture which traced many of its standards to a heritage of
feudalism. In an effort to do justice in an industrialized urban
society, with its complex economic and individual relationships,
modem common-law courts have found it necessary to formulate
increasingly subtle verbal refinements, to create subclassifications
among traditional common-law categories, and to delineate fine
gradations in the standards of care which the landowner owes to
each. Yet even within a single jurisdiction, the classifications and
subclassifications bred by the common law have produced
142

Gulbis, supra note 2, at 300.

143

See generally,e.g., Jones, 867 P.2d 303; Ouellette v. Blanchard, 364 A.2d 631 (N.H. 1976)

(mentioning both the Supreme Court decision and the English statute); Peterson v. Balach, 199 N.W.2d
639 (Minn. 1972); Pickard v. City and County of Honolulu, 452 P.2d 445 (Haw. 1969); Rowland v.
Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968).
144

Occupiers' Liability Act of 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, cl. 31 (Eng.).

145

Gulbis, supra note 2, at 299 n. 11. See generally Douglas Payne, The Occupiers' Liabillty

Act, 21 MOD. L. REV. 359 (1958).
146

358 U.S. 625 (1959) (holding common-law categories are not applicable in admiralty law

and that ship owner owes duty of reasonable care to those lawfully aboard ship).
147

Id. at 631-32.
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confusion and conflict. As new distinctions have been spawned,
older ones have become obscured. Through this semantic morass
the common law has moved, unevenly and with hesitation, towards
'imposing on owners and occupiers a single duty of reasonable
'48
care in all the circumstances.
Based on this disdain for the common-law classifications, the Supreme Court
refused to apply the categories in admiralty law.49
1.

Complete Abrogation of Status-based Liability

Following the rationale of both the Occupiers Liability Act of 1957150 and
Kermarec,"' the Supreme Court of California reached the landmark decision of
Rowland v. Christian."2 In this momentous decision, California became the first
jurisdiction to abolish the common-law categories of invitee, licensee, and
trespasser. 3 In Rowland, the plaintiff was injured when a bathroom fixture
malfunctioned and severed tendons and nerves in his right hand. 4 In reaching this
unprecedented decision, the court turned to statutory law, which provides that
individuals are liable for acts of negligence. 5 Further, the court noted the
"confusion and complexity" that existed in applying the common-law

148

Id. at 630-31 (citations omitted).

149

Id. at 631-32.

1so

See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.

151

See supra notes 145-48 and accompanying text.

152

443 P.2d 561, 566-68 (Cal. 1968).

153

Id. at 568.

154

Id. at 562.

Id. at 563-64. The court began its analysis by examining section 1714 of the California Civil
Code. Id. The statute provides,
[e]very one is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for
an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in
management of his property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or
by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714(a) (Deering 1994).
155
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classifications. 5 6 The court reasoned that this "complexity and confusion" was a
result of the difficulty in applying the "ancient terminology" to our "modem
157
society."'
The court summarized its basis for abandoning the classifications as
follows:
[a] man's life or limb does not become less worthy of protection by
the law nor a loss less worthy of compensation under the law
because he has come upon the land of another without permission
or with permission but without a business purpose. Reasonable
people do not ordinarily vary their conduct depending upon such
matters, and to focus upon the status of the injured party as a
trespasser, licensee, or invitee in order to determine the question
whether the landowner has a duty of care, is contrary to our
58
modem social mores and humanitarian values.
Thus, the court abandoned the common-law classification system for determining
a landowner's duty
and adopted, pursuant to statute, the single standard of
15 9
reasonable care.
The Rowland decision was a catalyst for similar judicial decisions across
the country."6 The Supreme Court of Colorado followed the lead of California and
abandoned the status classification system because of the "confusion and judicial
waste" created by the system; in addition, the classification system precludes ajury
from "applying changing community standards to a landowner's duties.' 161 The
court reasoned that a "modem legal system" should not permit these harsh results.

156

Rowland, 443 P.2d at 566.

157

Id. at 567. The court discussed that the "historical justifications for the common law

distinctions" are no longer "justified in the light of our modem society." Id.
158

Id. at 568.

159

Id.

See, e.g., Pickard v. City and County of Honolulu, 452 P.2d 445, 446 (Haw. 1969); Mile
High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 489 P.2d 308, 313 (Colo. 1971) (abolishing the classifications in favor
of a single standard of reasonable care).
160

161

Mile High Fence Co., 489 P.2d at 311-312.

162

Id.
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The District of Columbia has also eliminated the classifications because
eighteenth century rules are not "the proper tools with which to allocate the costs
and risk of loss for human injury."" The Supreme Court of New Hampshire also
recognized that the categories may be obsolete.1" The "social and policy
considerations" that created the categorical "immunities" are no longer valid in
today's society "and it is fitting and proper that they be laid to judicial rest."'65 The
New Hampshire court further noted that while the force of precedential law is a key
concern, it should be "balanced" with the recognition "of the need for responsible
growth and change in rules," which have not kept pace "with modem developments
in social and juridicial thought."' 66 Finally, the Supreme Court of Nevada
abandoned the classifications in'favor of the traditional negligence standard of care
analysis, reasoning that this is "a more enlightened and equitable means for
ascertaining liability."' 67
2.

Retention of Only the Trespasser Category

Instead of totally rejecting the common-law distinctions in determining a
landowner's liability, some jurisdictions have instituted an "intermediate position"
and abandoned the invitee and licensee status classifications while maintaining the
trespasser common-law category.'6 8 Most of these jurisdictions follow the
reasoning used by courts who have abandoned all three classifications, except that
the trespasser category was retained because the 1courts
felt that this classification
69
still has "significance in contemporary society.'5

163

Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 99 (D.C. Cir;. 1972) (applying District

of Columbia law), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973). The Arbaugh court also noted the "awkwardness
of fitting the circumstances of modem life into the rigid common law classifications of trespassers,
licensees, and invitees." Id.
164

Ouellette v. Blanchard, 364 A.2d 631, 634 (N.H. 1976).

165

Id.

166

Id. (quoting Sargent v. Ross, 308 A.2d 528, 534 (N.H. 1973)).

167

Moody v. Manny's Auto Repair, 871 P.2d 935, 942 (Nev. 1994).

168

Gulbis, supra note 2, at 299.

169

Id. (noting that forseeability of the injury as opposed to the status of the visitor should be

determinative). See, e.g., Jones v. Hansen, 867 P.2d 303, 310 (Kan. 1994) (noting "that the status of
a trespasser retains significance in our contemporary society.").
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After a discussion of the decisions and reasons for abandoning the commonlaw classifications, 170 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts decided to retain
the trespasser category because the court reasoned that "there is a significant
difference in the legal status of one who trespasses on another's land as opposed to
one who is on the land under some color of right - such as a licensee or invitee."' 7'
In Florida, the trespasser classification was retained because a landowner has a right
to "privacy" with regard to his "own premises" and should not be held liable -to
individuals "who choose to avail themselves of it at will. 17' Also, the Supreme
7
Court of Rhode Island, which had previously abrogated all three classifications,' 1
resurrected the trespasser category reasoning that "[p]roperty owners have a basic
right to be free from liability to those who engage in self-destructive activity on
their premises without their permission."' 74
In O'Leary v. Coenen, Ts the Supreme Court of North Dakota abandoned
the classifications of licensee and invitee because the categories preclude a jury
"from applying changing community standards . . .;" the classifications "can
mislead a jury;" and the "distinctions and exceptions" render using the categories
"complex, confusing, and inequitable." 76 However, the court noted the "significant
difference between the status of one who trespasses on the property of another and
one who enters under some color of right to do So.' ' 177 Thus, North Dakota
abrogated the licensee and invitee categories while retaining the trespasser
78
classification.1

170

See supra notes 143-67 and accompanying text.
Mounsey v. Ellard, 297 N.E.2d 43, 51 n.7 (Mass. 1973).

172

Wood v. Camp, 284 So.2d 691, 696 (Fla. 1973).

173

Mariorenzi v. Joseph DiPonte, Inc., 333 A.2d 127, 133 (R-I. 1975). The court gave "a final

but fitting interment to the common-law categories of invitee, licensee, and trespasser as well as their
extensions, exceptions, and extrapolations." Id.

174
Tantimonico v. Allendale Mutual Ins. Co., 637 A.2d 1056, 1061 (R.I. 1994). The court
noted that "[tlhe common-law rule developed over the centuries accomplishes this purpose clearly and
without equivocation." Id.
175

251 N.W.2d 746 (N.D. 1977).

176

Id. at 752.

177

Id. at 751 n.6.

178

Id. at 752.
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Recently, Nebraska has abandoned the common-law distinctions with
respect to invitees and licensees while retaining the trespasser category.179 The
Supreme Court of Nebraska held that the common-law distinctions "should not
... shield those who would otherwise be held to a standard of reasonable care but
for the arbitrary classification of the visitor as a licensee."' 80 The court justified
retaining the trespasser category because a landowner should not be required to
exercise reasonable care "to those not lawfully on one's property."''
VI. PREDICTION FOR WEST VIRGINIA LAW
Recently, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals rejected the
suggestion of abrogating the common-law classifications.!8 " The court based its
decision on the specific measure provided by the distinctions.' Further, the court
has expressed great interest in maintaining the categories for determining a
landowner's duty of care." Based on these decisions, West Virginia is unlikely to
abandon the common-law categories in favor of a single standard of reasonable care
for landowners.
However, if the issue were to be properly raised before the court, it seems
that West Virginia would likely take the intermediate position and abrogate the
distinction between the invitees and licensees while retaining the trespasser
distinction. In the Selfdecision, Justice Starcher advocated the position of retaining
the trespasser category while adopting a single standard of reasonable care for
Starcher reasoned that landowners do not
premises owners in other situations.'
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Heins v. Webster County, 552 N.W.2d 51, 57 (Neb. 1996).

18O

Id.
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Id. The court noted that the key factor in determining liability is the forseeability of the

injury. Id.
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See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
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Self v. Queen, 487 S.E.2d 295, 298 (W. Va. 1997).
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Miller v. Monongahela Power Co., 403 S.E.2d 406,411 (W. Va. 1991). The court reasoned

that "[the court has] consistently recognized and applied the distinctions for liability purposes among
trespassers, licensees, and invitees." Id. The court noted that "[w]ith regard to ordinary possessors
of land, we enthusiastically reaffirm the common law distinctions among trespassers, licensees and
invitees." Id. See also Cavender v. Fouty, 464 S.E.2d 736, 739 (W. Va. 1995); Jack v. Fritts 457
S.E.2d 431, 437 (W. Va. 1995) (quoting Miller as reaffirming the common-law classifications).
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Self,487 S.E.2d at 300-02 (Starcher, J., concurring).
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"manage their property with these common-law status distinctions in mind."'8 6 On
87
the other hand, because "a landowner doesn't owe a trespasser the time of day,"'
the landowner should only be required to refrain from willful and wanton
misconduct when dealing with trespassers. Based on the concurring opinion of
Justice Starcher and Chief Justice Workman, the intermediate approach will likely
be the system adopted by West Virginia, if a majority of the court would follow the
reasoning of these two justides.
VII. CONCLUSION

With the Self decision, the state supreme court has retained an area of
jurisprudence which was developed in feudal England. As a result, individuals in
West Virginia who have been injured as a result of the negligence of others will go
uncompensated solely because they were on the property for the "wrong" reasons.
However, it is unlikely that landowners and visitors will alter their behavior as a
result of the Self court's holding.'
While the majority contends that the common-law distinctions provide a
"rudder or compass" to ajury,'89 the categories preclude ajury from determining
the appropriate standards of behavior a member of the community should exercise.
This task would be accomplished if a single standard of reasonable care were used
in premises-injury cases as in most other negligence cases. Perhaps West Virginia
should place more trust in juries to decide what constitutes reasonable behavior
rather than relying on eighteenth century common law to do so.
Thomas S. Kleeh"
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Id. at 300.
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